| When the problem du jour consumes a U.S. | | | | |
| management team, offshore activities can too | | | | But by then, significant damage may have |
| often be left to operate in a vacuum. This | | | | occurred. "I didn't hear anything about it |
| situation is particularly true when the U.S. | | | | and assumed that everything was OK," your |
| management and technical personnel have | | | | U.S. team members offer in their defense. |
| "other" responsibilities in addition to | | | | But how could they hear about it? They were |
| overseeing or helping the offshore | | | | too swamped to listen. Explanations and |
| organization. | | | | excuses always exist, but not only don't they |
| | | | solve problems, they don't prevent them. You |
| When the offshore team senses that you are | | | | need to have escalation and other management |
| too busy with other issues, generally they | | | | processes in place and create an environment |
| will not push hard and aggressively get your | | | | where your offshore team feels comfortable to |
| attention to get a solution. They will try | | | | bring forward issues, regardless of how busy |
| their best to develop a work around and try | | | | you are. In addition, a regular program to |
| to solve it on their own - which they may not | | | | review offshore projects from a process and |
| be able to do. Depending on the nature and | | | | procedure viewpoint can prevent this |
| severity of the problems that distract | | | | situation and assure that U.S. and offshore |
| management, the situation offshore can become | | | | teams remain aligned and in sych. |
| very severe before it hits your radar screen. | | | | |